Hazardous air pollutants are regulated under Title IlIl of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The Amendments replace the risk-based approach mandated in the 1977 Amendments with a prescriptive, technology-based approach requiring that maximum achievable control technology (MACT) be applied to all major industrial sources of 189 hazardous air pollutants. The change reflects political, rather than scientific consensus that the public health benefits justify the costs. The choice is put into perspective by looking at the interface between science and policy that occurs as part of regular decisionmaking. Particular emphasis is given to examining the interrelationships among facts (science), judgments (science policy), and policy (values) in the context of the risk assessment paradigm. Science and policy are discussed in relation to Title l1l, contrasting the political consensus for action with the scientific uncertainty about risks and benefits. It is argued that a balanced research program is needed to get the facts right about hazardous air pollutants, including research to meet statutory requirements, to reduce uncertainties in risk assessment, and to address strategic issues. -Environ Health Perspect 103(Suppl 6): 213-222 (1995) 
Introduction
In the United States, there is a longstanding societal commitment to safeguarding people's health from the adverse effects of toxic agents in the environment. This is reflected in the missions, mandates, and actions of federal regulatory agencies like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) . At Helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper were provided by 1 must make to balance trade-offs between economic and societal costs of government intervention on one hand and corresponding benefits to public health or environmental quality on the other.
This article looks at how science is used in making regulatory decisions and examines Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as a case study. The discussion is divided into two major sections: a general survey of regulatory decision making with emphasis on the role of science and an examination of the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the Clean Air Act.
Survey of Regulatory Decision Making
It is useful, at the outset, to examine the conceptual framework for regulatory decisions, keeping in mind that practical realities often intervene to make real-world decisions more complicated and harder to analyze.
Science Policy: The Interface between Science and Policy
In the process of regulatory decision making, there is a direct interface between science and policy. Science is used here in its broadest sense to encompass research and development, technical and research support, monitoring and data collection, review and interpretation of technical investigations, and assessments of health and environmental risks. Policy is used to mean decisions both about the acceptability of risks and about the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of intervention to prevent and reduce unacceptable risks. The interface between science and policy has been called science policy, and in the context of regulatory decision making, it has two complementary meanings (1, 2) : the use of science to make judgments about the formulation and implementation of policy (e.g., quantitative risk assessment), and the development of policy specifically for science (e.g., setting priorities for research directions and funding).
As depicted in Figure 1 , science and policy can be conceptualized as existing on opposite ends of a fact-value continuum. Science is portrayed as primarily factual, with a smaller but important value component, while policy is comprised primarily of values, with a smaller but important factual component. Science Because of the contentiousness of many regulatory decisions, the NRC expresses concern "that scientific interpretations in risk assessment will be distorted by policy considerations." Partially in response to these concerns, the Council recommended "reorganization to ensure that risk assessments are protected from inappropriate policy influences and development and use of uniform guidelines for carrying out risk assessments." The NRC made it plain that "The importance of distinguishing between risk assessment and risk management does not imply that they should be isolated from each other; in practice they interact, and communication in both directions is desirable and should not be disrupted."
Although the NRC pointed out the problems associated with organizational separation and emphasized the need for communication among researchers, risk assessors, and risk managers, the 1983 report has served as the rationale to justify compartmentalization of regulatory decision making. As summarized in Figure 2 , the NRC made clear conceptual distinctions between research and risk assessment and between risk assessment and risk management. Both conceptual and organizational distinctions among these different phases are now well-entrenched within many federal bureaucracies.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of observers question (or reject outright) this separation of facts (science) and values (policy). They argue that, in reality, science and policy are inseparable, and they find no rational basis for the existing compartmentalization, which they view as artificial, arbitrary, and counterproductive. These critics contend that formal integration of science and policy is necessary to foster better and more consensual societal decisions about environmental health risks (2, (7) (8) (9) (10) .
An alternative to the more traditional approach (Figure 2) for conceptualizing the key aspects of regulatory decision making is pictured in Figure 3 Scientists not only conduct research (generating facts), but many also play a critical role in science policy (judgments about the use of facts) by serving as technical consultants, peer reviewers, policy advocates, and mediators (2) . A major role of scientists in the regulatory process is to provide expert advice about science policy issues, e.g., validation of long-term research strategies, certification of study protocols and analytical methodologies, definition of standards of adequacy for scientific evidence, and approval of inferences from studies and experiments (2) . The lack of scientific certainty normally associated with science policy issues puts a premium on scientific consensus. In the face of significant uncertainty regarding issues such as the adequacy of scientific evidence and the appropriateness of inferences from existing data, consensus among a diverse spectrum of respected scientists functions as a stabilizing factor and intellectual anchor; it focuses attention on critical, unresolved technical questions and lends credibility to both the process and its products.
In contrast to the scientist, the regulator must go beyond consideration of the scientific facts supporting the decision process. An obvious solution is to invest adequate resources in targeted research and surveillance to reduce the most critical scientific uncertainties that currently limit our ability to estimate risks realistically. Although the roles of the scientist and regulator may be different, it is clear that they share a common goal-the reduction of scientific uncertainty to improve the assessment of health and environmental risks (14) (15) (16) .
Viewpoints on the Value ofScience
Focusing on the practical realities of realworld regulatory decisions, divergent viewpoints have emerged about the intrinsic value of science in the politically and emotionally charged atmosphere that surrounds many environmental health issues such as neighborhood cancer clusters, Alar-contaminated apples, and asbestos in schools. Generally speaking, opinions about the relative importance of science (e.g., data on exposure and toxicity) in regulatory decision making can be grouped into three broad categories ( Figure 4 ): a) science is a critical, often central, factor in decisions (17) (18) (19) (20) ; b) science plays a marginal and often insignificant role in what are basically political decisions (2, (21) (22) (23) ; and c) science is one of several factors in a multifactorial decision-making process (8, 9, 21, 24) .
The traditional view, consistent with the risk assessment paradigm (3) 
Factors Affecting the Role ofScience in Regulatory Decisions
The role that science plays in regulatory decision making depends on certain characteristics of the situation. Although this issue has received little attention, it is evident that situational variables such as media scrutiny, public outrage over perceived risks, political pressure to do something, legal requirements Figure 5 . Simplified life cycle of a public policy issue.
being socially acceptable (e.g., probability less that one in a million) to being selectively unacceptable (e.g., probability greater that one in a million), or vice versa. Science with boundary-crossing implications is more likely to play a central role in regulatory decisions and, for that reason, to be more contentious.
Finally, as a practical matter, regulatory decision makers respond to the realities imposed on them by a complex and constantly changing environment ( Figure 7A ) (26) (27) (28) (29) (39) .
Given the inadequacy of the scientific database, the resulting uncertainty about air pollution health risks, and the enormous costs of implementing the regulations, there has been surprisingly little criticism of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in general and of Title III in particular (33, 34, 40) . Currently, both critics and supporters of the amendments appear to see them as a significant step toward achieving the goal of clean air. As the costs become more apparent, however, the benefits of the CAAA will come under increasing scrutiny (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) Figure 8 . Summary of the adequacy of available data on 189 hazardous air pollutants. Adapted from U.S. EPA (39) .
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Despite the scarcity of data, these regulatory officials seem confident that improvements in public health have occurred already and that they will continue to acrue in the future from implementation of the CAAA. Their optimism appears to be based on the assumption that a direct relationship exists between regulatory actions and related emissions reductions and between emissions reductions and reduced health risks (Figure 9 ). Under this assumption, keeping score of the public health benefits is possible by tallying the number of major regulatory actions taken ( Figure 9B ), summing the estimated reduction in emissions related to these actions ( Figure 9A ), and then calculating the estimated decrease in cancer risk based on standard EPA approaches ( Figure 9C ). This assumption may, however, have no basis in fact and, without appropriate data, cannot be verified (4, 48, 49) .
All this suggests that it would be difficult to argue that Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments is science driven. The scientific information and understanding necessary to quantify the risks from outdoor exposure to hazardous air pollutants with a reasonable degree of certainty are simply unavailable in most cases. In their absence, adequate political concern and consensus among elected officials is sufficient to drive regulatory action. Although the public health benefits are uncertain, a political decision has been made to get on with the business of cleaning the air. Figure  1OA ) covering: a) routine testing and monitoring to meet statutory requirements; b) research aimed at reducing uncertainties in risk assessment; and c) research focusing on broad strategic issues. Keeping in mind that these three research directions are not mutually exclusive, characteristics generally associated with each are listed in Figure  10B . A combination of all three research approaches is necessary to establish a firm and credible foundation for informed decision making ( Figure 10C ).
Researh in
Research to meet key statutory requirements is usually the top priority for regulators since theirs is the task of implementing the statutes. Typically, this type of work consists primarily of filling key data gaps by testing for cancer or noncancer effects emphasizes improvement of the quality and quantity of the scientific database, while research to address the second problem develops and applies mechanistically based methods and models (12, 16 Instead, the approach is based on a political decision by Congress that to wait for a body count before taking action would not be in the public interest.
Because political consensus, which is often tenuous, is not necessarily synonymous with scientific consensus, research should not be stymied by the politics of clean air. In the face of significant uncertainties about the public health benefits of Title III, a comprehensive research program should be undertaken to establish a solid, credible scientific basis for decision making. This would necessarily involve a balanced approach that includes research to meet statutory deadlines, to reduce uncertainties in risk assessment, and to answer key strategic questions.
Because strategic research has the potential to challenge dogma, shift paradigms, and reorder priorities, it may not engender much political and bureaucratic support. Nevertheless, the need for strategic research is getting stronger as concerns mount about the relative costs and benefits of regulating uncertain health risks. Informed, cost-effective protection of public health requires a blending and balancing of facts and values. If we are to get the facts right, investing in sound science is essential.
